A monitoring organisation claims that, with or without Taliban cooperation, Al-Qaeda has “blended itself with the TTP.” The Taliban’s claim that terrorist organisations are not using Afghan territory for cross-border violence has been rejected by a United Nations Security Council report, which calls the claim “not credible” and warns that neighbouring states increasingly view Afghanistan as a source of regional insecurity. More than four years after the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan in August 2021, international observers’ concerns about the country’s security situation are growing. This assessment is included in the sixteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, which was presented to the UN Security Council. The de facto authorities nevertheless deny that any terrorist organisations operate from or have a presence on their territory.
Recently, Iran hosted a gathering of special representatives for Afghanistan in Tehran, which included all of Kabul’s neighbours as well as Moscow. However, the Taliban decided not to attend. They anticipated embarrassing questions regarding terrorists operating on their soil and chose to boycott the Tehran summit. Indeed, Islamabad’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, Mohammad Sadiq, emphasised the terrorist threat emanating from Afghan soil, stating that if Kabul wished to build confidence with its neighbours, it needed to confront the issue of militancy. Meanwhile, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stressed that Afghanistan’s neighbours were the “most natural and dependable” actors who could assist Kabul in resolving its difficulties.
Afghanistan’s neighbours were described as the “most natural and dependable” actors who could assist Kabul in resolving its issues, according to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Additionally, Mr Araghchi subtly alluded to Western nation-building efforts in Afghanistan by stating that “imported preparations” had failed to stabilise the country. Such gatherings demonstrate that Afghanistan’s neighbours are prepared to cooperate with the Taliban government to assist the Afghan people and support initiatives aimed at boosting the country’s economy. However, there is little others can do if the Taliban refuse to engage with regional states.
Afghan soil remains a significant impediment to improving relations with neighbouring countries. While some groups, such as IS, are opposed to the Taliban, others, including the proscribed TTP and Al-Qaeda, enjoy friendly relations with their hosts. Every TTP warlord becomes a vital part of the Taliban system, as they are brothers-in-arms and blend together like watercolour. Afghanistan-based extremists have impacted more than just Islamabad. In fact, the Taliban lack credibility to a significant degree. The Afghan Taliban clergy did not provide the United States with firm assurances in the Doha Agreement, signed on 29 February 2020, and they are unlikely to offer similar assurances to Islamabad. Almost all regional initiatives, including those previously mentioned-the SCO Standing Group on Afghanistan, the Istanbul Process, and the Extended “Troika”-have Islamabad as an active participant. Participation in such regional gatherings is now a key component of Islamabad’s policy towards Kabul.
Kabul is not primarily a military challenge; it is a political challenge requiring a military strategy.
Major strategic considerations underpin Islamabad’s determination to participate in regional dialogue conferences on Afghanistan, particularly in the Tehran Format. First, due to the scale, duration, and severity of its exposure to instability in Kabul, Islamabad views itself as the most significant stakeholder in Afghanistan’s security and strategic affairs. Islamabad has suffered the most from cross-border infiltration and terrorist acts originating from Afghan territory, in addition to managing a highly porous border with Afghanistan and hosting millions of Afghan refugees for decades. As a result, Islamabad seeks to remain fully engaged in all regional discussions concerning Afghanistan.
The roots of instability date back to the Saur Revolution, which marked the beginning of sustained turbulence. Kabul’s overt involvement in Pakistan through its claims to “Pakhtunistan” marked the start of this instability. Although Pakistan managed to curb Afghan overreach, it nevertheless became deeply entangled in Afghan politics. With the assistance of Islamist parties in Afghanistan, it attempted to undermine the Saur Revolution of April 1978. Subsequently, as refugees, the Mujahideen, and eventually the Taliban, Afghans were permitted to seek refuge in Pakistan’s tribal areas and elsewhere. Even in recent weeks, Chinese workers in Tajikistan have been targeted in at least two deadly attacks originating from Afghanistan.
Islamabad continues to view itself as the most significant stakeholder in Afghanistan’s security and strategic affairs. Despite numerous documented human rights violations, systematic mistreatment of women, and the continued ban on girls’ education, Taliban leadership has succeeded in establishing a diplomatic presence in thirty-nine global cities. Beijing, the UAE, Uzbekistan, Islamabad, and New Delhi have welcomed Taliban diplomats in their capitals, while Moscow remains the only state to have officially recognised the clerical administration. In matters of border management, refugees, and trade, Islamabad must exercise patience and pursue dialogue with varying degrees of pressure. The issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan cannot be resolved militarily without risking blowback. Rather than overreacting to Taliban visits to India, Pakistan should reassure Kabul that while it has the sovereign right to maintain relations with India, it also bears the responsibility of acting as a sovereign state by preventing the TTP and Baloch insurgents from using its territory. Simultaneously, Islamabad must dismantle these outfits domestically, thereby encouraging the Taliban administration to act against weakened and less useful proxies.
Even if the Taliban clergy wished to do so, they could not resolve this issue for Islamabad alone. In short, Kabul is not primarily a military challenge; it is a political challenge requiring a military strategy.
The writer is a PhD candidate at QAU and has worked at SDPI.