Since taking power in August 2021, the Taliban’s governance has been characterized by a “triple failure” in legitimacy, security, and welfare. As of early 2026, the regime has prioritised an extremist ideological agenda over national stability, leading to deepened regional isolation and a severe humanitarian crisis.
Persistent linkage of the Afghan Taliban ruling regime with banned Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has created a cycle of regional friction that severely undermines Afghanistan’s economic stability and internal security as of early 2026. This relationship, rooted in ideological fraternity and shared history, has led to increased border closures with Pakistan and international isolation, directly impacting the livelihoods of Afghan citizens The Taliban’s 2021 return to power reshaped regional security, providing a major boost to the banned TTP through the release of thousands of fighters and the provision of safe havens in eastern Afghanistan.
Despite Pakistani pressure, the Taliban government has not curtailed the TTP due to shared ideological ties and operational support from other groups like Al-Qaeda. The primary economic damage stems from the frequent disruption of trade routes with Pakistan, which remains Afghanistan’s most practical and cost-effective gateway to international markets. The Taliban’s refusal to curtail the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has become a primary driver of regional instability.
Despite official denials, reports from the UNSC confirm that approximately 6,000 TTP fighters operate from sanctuaries in eastern Afghanistan (Khost, Kunar, Nangarhar). TTP-led attacks in Pakistan increased throughout 2025, with over 600 attacks recorded. This has triggered retaliatory airstrikes by Pakistan on Afghan soil, resulting in civilian casualties. UN Monitoring Team states that the Taliban “do not seek popular support or consent” and describes Hibatullah Akhundzada as the absolute ruler, isolated in Kandahar and operating in primarily religious terms.
A regime cannot claim recovery when national output rises on paper but every Afghan’s share of that output is shrinking.
It also reports that the Taliban do not recognize the need for public support for their policies. The Taliban is not merely an unpopular government. It is a power structure that rejects the very idea of popular consent. Taliban figures who questioned girls’ education bans faced dismissal, exile or detention, showing that the regime suppresses moderation inside its own ranks before it ever reaches the public. The Taliban have entrenched a system of oppression that the International Criminal Court and UN experts have labeled “gender apartheid.”
Women are almost entirely erased from public life, with bans on secondary and higher education and severe restrictions on employment. Only 7% of women were employed outside the home in 2024. The 2025 “Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice” law formalised restrictions on women’s voices and movement, even prohibiting them from traveling without a male guardian.
These restrictions have weakened the delivery of basic services; over 400 health facilities closed in 2025 due to funding cuts and the lack of female healthcare workers. World Bank projects Afghanistan’s GDP to grow by 4.3% in FY2025, but population growth of 8.6%, driven by more than two million returnees, means GDP per capita is expected to decline by 4.0%. The same report warns that rapid population growth is eroding per-capita income and that Afghanistan risks remaining trapped in low growth, high vulnerability and humanitarian dependence.
A regime cannot claim recovery when national output rises on paper but every Afghan’s share of that output is shrinking. Returnees, drought, aid cuts and border tensions have overwhelmed jobs and services. Taliban messaging celebrates aggregates while household welfare deteriorates. According to recent data, the Taliban’s governance has fostered an aid-reliant survival economy rather than a functional, self-sustaining state.
The UNDP reports that nearly 65% of Afghans suffer from multidimensional poverty, with subsistence insecurity rising to 75% in 2024.While OCHA targeted 22.9 million people for aid in 2025, the 2026 outlook remains dire, with 21.9 million still in need and 17.5 million prioritized for emergency support. The state remains a “shell” supported by the international community; over 40% of public revenue comes from external financing, and the World Bank notes that basic services are almost entirely dependent on donor funding.
The current-account deficit is expected to hit 31.9% of GDP in 2025, underscoring a total reliance on foreign funds to pay for essential imports and daily consumptions.
The writer is a freelance columnist.