The continuing Operation Shaban in Balochistan has now become more than a counterterrorism campaign. Security forces killed three more terrorists on Thursday, taking the reported toll in the operation to 91, while state media says 129 terrorists have been killed in intelligence-based actions in the province.
The operation was launched after the attack on the Mangi Dam police post, where nine policemen were martyred at the site. It was a deliberate assault on the state’s most exposed line of defence–local policemen serving in a province where every post, road and convoy has begun to carry the weight of a wider war.
The state’s response is, therefore, necessary. Armed groups that attack police, soldiers, civilians, roads and public infrastructure cannot be reasoned with through hesitation. The Pakistan Army, Frontier Corps and Balochistan Police are right to pursue those responsible, and the public should have no doubt about the need to dismantle networks involved in such attacks.
Yet the test of Operation Shaban will not rest solely on how many militants are killed. Pakistan has seen too many campaigns whose battlefield gains faded once attention moved elsewhere. Successful counterterrorism is built on intelligence, policing, border control, criminal prosecution, financial disruption and local confidence.
The warning signs were visible much before Mangi Dam. Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies reported that Balochistan recorded 71 terrorist attacks in May, up from 34 in April. Kidnappings also surged, with 52 of 54 abductions nationwide reported from the province. They show militant groups testing mobility, fear and administrative reach.
Balochistan is home to strategic mineral, port and transport projects. Every attack on a police post, convoy or supply route raises the cost of doing business, weakens investor confidence and deepens the impression that Pakistan’s resource frontier remains hostage to violence. Saindak, Reko Diq and Gwadar cannot be secured by perimeter walls alone.
The missing piece is governance. People in Balochistan must see roads, schools, clinics, jobs, fair policing, local participation and transparent resource benefits. Such measures are not concessions to militancy. They are the conditions under which militancy loses oxygen.
Operation Shaban must succeed. However, victories counted only in bodies rarely endure. The lasting measure will be whether the writ of the state returns not merely to the mountains and roads of Balochistan, but to the everyday lives of its people. *