The suicide bombing in Bajaur District that killed 11 soldiers and a child has once again torn away the flimsy veil covering Pakistan’s most pressing security quandary. On Wednesday, Islamabad summoned the Afghan deputy head of mission in a rare, stern diplomatic rebuke.
When the Afghan Taliban assumed control in 2021, they pledged to prevent terror groups from using Afghanistan as a springboard for external attacks. That pledge now rings hollow.
The absence of visible, sustained measures against insurgents whose leadership operates with de facto freedom across the border speaks to distorted priorities–a regime more at ease with a permissive frontier than with dismantling entrenched militant networks. The Foreign Office’s warning that Pakistan reserves the right to pursue and eliminate khawarij wherever they lurk echoes Defence Minister Khawaja Asif’s blunt argument that Islamabad will not hesitate to launch air operations inside Afghanistan if necessary. Islamabad is yet to rise above the suicide blast that struck at its heart earlier this month, killing 36 worshippers. It was the deadliest assault in the city in a decade, and the bloodshed echoes earlier nightmares (a 2014 school massacre, for example) that haunt public memory.
While an affiliate of the Islamic State claimed that attack, militants linked to the TTP remain central to a broader insurgency that has struck security forces, schools, courts and civilian gatherings. This unrelenting death toll of children, soldiers, and civilians has hardened public opinion, as many now see the Afghan border as a graveyard for promises. Every round of diplomatic protests, every weighty communiqué, seems only to invite another reprisal. According to international assessments, thousands of TTP fighters now operate from inside Afghanistan, exploiting Kabul’s inability or unwillingness to shut down their infrastructure. Of course, there does exist a countervailing view within Pakistan’s polity. This week, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Governor Faisal Kundi reminded leaders that war is not the only answer. He urged a balanced strategy that pairs robust security measures with political outreach, legal trade, and enhanced people-to-people ties with Afghanistan. Such counsel is not born of naivety but of the recognition that militarised retaliation alone cannot cure what is as much a political and social dilemma as a security one.
There are no easy answers, but clear truths must be faced. No state can be faulted for defending its citizens. Islamabad’s insistence on safeguarding its territory is legitimate. But defence cannot morph into isolation. Hardening the border with better surveillance and decisive intelligence cooperation are necessary steps. Equally necessary, however, is the patient, pragmatic diplomacy that acknowledges Afghanistan’s own internal constraints while pushing Kabul towards verifiable action against groups that pay no heed to international norms. *