The Iran track is not dead. That, rather than any grand announcement, is the meaning of the latest indirect US-Iran talks in Doha. Mediators have spoken of “positive progress, with oil falling to a four-month low as fears of immediate disruption in the Strait of Hormuz eased. Yet this is not peace–at least not the kind that can be called lasting, enforceable or sustainable. Separate meetings held with Qatari and Pakistani mediators reportedly dealt with difficult technical questions of maritime traffic through Hormuz, Iran’s frozen assets, nuclear guarantees and sanctions relief. No permanent settlement has been reached, and further talks are expected after the funeral of Iran’s late supreme leader. The reported understanding on the release of Iranian funds should therefore be read not as a breakthrough, but as a sign that both Washington and Tehran still see value in managed de-escalation.
Qatar may be the immediate venue, but Pakistan has been part of the broader diplomatic architecture that kept channels open when the region was closer to a wider war. Earlier mediation efforts involving Pakistan helped create the political environment in which technical discussions will continue. This is important and something we should never forget. If the US-Iran track holds, Islamabad has practical interests to pursue. It needs clarity on legitimate trade with Iran, electricity imports, controlled border commerce and, eventually, the long-stalled gas pipeline. But none of this can move beyond rhetoric unless Washington provides legal and financial space.
The more interesting development, however, lies in Washington’s changing relationship with Israel. The Iran war has exposed a widening gap between American and Israeli interests. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s politics depend on permanent confrontation with Tehran. President Donald Trump, by contrast, has reasons to want a deal: lower oil prices, Gulf business, a claim of diplomatic success and avoidance of another open-ended Middle Eastern war. It would be premature to speak of the end of the US-Israel alliance. It would be equally mistaken to ignore that the old assumption–that Israeli escalation automatically becomes American policy–is no longer as safe as it once was. American public opinion is also shifting. A Pew survey this year found that 60 per cent of American adults held an unfavourable view of Israel, up sharply from 2022; among Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents, the figure was 80 per cent. These numbers do not dictate policy overnight. Still, they tend to change the political weather, making unconditional support for Israel more contestable, and giving any US president greater room to distinguish between American interests and Israeli preferences.
This divergence may create diplomatic openings, but writing closer to home, Pakistan’s line, as before, should be principled and practical: regional war is disastrous; no state should be allowed to sabotage negotiations through unilateral escalation and diplomacy with Iran should be pursued without unsettling ties with the Gulf. The country has too often been relevant because others were at war. This time, it should try to make itself relevant to peace. *