The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960 under the auspices of the World Bank, remains one of the most enduring examples of trans- boundary water governance. It created a binding legal framework for the distribution of the Indus river system between India and Pakistan at a time when both states were still defining their post-colonial relationship. Under its terms, the three eastern rivers – the Beas, Ravi, and Sutlej – were allocated to India for unrestricted use, while the three western rivers – the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab – were assigned to Pakistan. The arrangement recognised Pakistan’s dependence on these western rivers for agriculture, energy, and economic stability. The IWT did not give India a free hand over the western rivers. It permitted only India to develop run-of-the-river hydroelectric projects, but explicitly barred the storage of water and any actions that would disrupt downstream flows essential to Pakistan’s survival. This balance was the core of the agreement: allowing limited upstream development while protecting downstream rights. For over six decades, despite wars, diplomatic crises, and political hostility, the mechanism held because both sides operated within its legal boundaries. That equilibrium was tested after the Pahalgam attack episode in April 2025. In its aftermath, India unilaterally declared that it would hold the treaty in abeyance. The move was legally untenable. Nowhere in the text of the Indus Waters Treaty is there a provision for unilateral suspension or abeyance. The agreement is designed to be resilient precisely because water cannot be subjected to the fluctuations of political disputes. By attempting to sidestep its obligations outside the treaty’s own procedures, India acted contrary to the very instrument it helped create. Pakistan responded by activating the treaty’s dispute resolution mechanism, which provides for a neutral expert, a Court of Arbitration, and ultimately recourse to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The process moved forward even after India chose to boycott the proceedings both administratively and legally. On May 15, 2026, the PCA issued a supplemental award, reaffirming that the treaty’s procedures must be followed and that unilateral actions have no standing. The award underscored a principle central to international law: states cannot pick and choose which parts of a binding agreement they will honour. The significance of this episode extends beyond the immediate India-Pakistan dispute.
Strategic interests are best served when states operate within predictable legal structures.
It has become a test case for how states treat international agreements when those agreements constrain their freedom of action. The message from legal and diplomatic forums has been consistent. Signatory states cannot advocate for a rules-based international order on global platforms while undermining the very rules mutually agreed to be followed. Credibility in multilateral diplomacy depends on consistency. When a state withholds cooperation from arbitration, rejects established procedures, and seeks to alter binding obligations through unilateral declaration, it erodes trust not only with its counterparty but with the broader international system.India now faces a credibility problem that is no longer confined to its relationship with Pakistan. The record of its conduct is being documented in successive legal forums and diplomatic exchanges. Each instance of evasion, boycott, or procedural defiance adds to a growing body of evidence that suggests a disregard for treaty obligations and arbitration. This matters because international law functions only if states believe that commitments will be honoured and that breaches will have consequences. When a state signals that it will disregard those commitments when inconvenient, it weakens the norm itself. Pakistan’s approach, by contrast, has been to anchor its response in law and procedure. It relied on the treaty’s own mechanisms, submitted to arbitration, and accepted the outcome even when politically costly. That stance reinforces the principle that agreements must be resolved through the institutions created for that purpose, not through unilateral pressure. It also positions Pakistan as a state defending the integrity of international legal frameworks, rather than seeking to dismantle them. The broader implication is clear. Strategic interests are best served when states operate within predictable legal structures. Water, by its nature, cannot be managed through coercion alone. The Indus system sustains millions of livelihoods and underpins regional stability. Any attempt to use it as leverage outside the treaty risks not only immediate humanitarian and economic consequences but also long-term reputational damage. The international community is paying attention. The legal record is expanding with each ruling and procedural step. And with each unilateral move that bypasses those procedures, India is losing ground in the argument it claims to champion: that international conduct should be governed by rules, not power. The PCA’s May 2026 award is a reminder that those terms still matter, and that attempts to circumvent them invite both legal and diplomatic costs. In the end, the choice for India is between reinforcing the rules-based order or being recorded as the state that chose to undermine it.
The writer is a student.