In the fiscal strain following Pakistan’s latest IMF Extended Fund Facility, the government turned to Gulf capital as a lifeline. During Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan’s visit in April 2024, Riyadh pledged $5 billion in sectoral investments, covering agriculture, mining, IT, and aviation-a signal of Gulf willingness to fill Islamabad’s financing void. Meanwhile, Islamabad has set its sights on up to $6 billion worth of corporate farming deals from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain, aiming to develop 1.5 million acres of uncultivated land and modernise 50 million acres of farmland. This shift, though projected as reform-oriented, is rooted in deeper geopolitical alignments. With traditional lenders offering rigid conditionalities, Gulf states have positioned themselves as not just financiers but strategic stakeholders shaping Pakistan’s economic contours.
In June 2023, the Special Investment Facilitation Council was established as a civil-military nexus to fast-track Gulf investment. It has marked 1.92 million hectares (4.8 million acres) of so-called “barren” land for corporate farming; around 400,000 hectares are already leased to Gulf-backed firms on 30-year agreements. The Land Information and Management System, set up under SIFC, uses geospatial technology and is co-funded by Saudi Arabia (with a reported $500 million investment) alongside the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and China. While it is presented as a leap toward precision agriculture and climate-resilient farming, critics question the intent and implementation, arguing that it is geared more toward exporting food to Gulf states than nourishing domestic supply chains.
Gulf investments provide Pakistan with much-needed financial ballast, but unchecked, they risk trading sovereignty and public trust for short-term stability.
Corporate farming is being pushed under the Green Pakistan Initiative. Under this model, Pakistan retains 60 per cent of output, with 40 per cent earmarked for export, primarily to Gulf states. The arrangement may appear balanced, but analysts have noted how the most fertile lands are being prioritised for export-based production, leaving marginal or arid plots for domestic food security programs. Reports suggest that at least eight major Gulf agribusinesses, including SALIC (Saudi Agricultural and Livestock Investment Company) and Al Dahra, are either already operational or in advanced negotiations. This transformation is accompanied by infrastructure commitments, such as 1200-kilometre canal networks, solar-based drip irrigation pilots, and mechanised harvesting systems. Yet, none of these plans underwent parliamentary scrutiny, nor were provincial land commissions fully consulted in allocating land for foreign leaseholds.
A controversial canal system in Cholistan, planned for irrigating 4.8 million acres via six channels branching from the Indus, triggered protests and Sindh Assembly resolutions. Construction was subsequently halted in April 2025 after federal pushback. The canal was intended to serve privately operated farms, but communities argued it would drain already over-exploited water reserves, violating inter-provincial water accords. Fisherfolk and indigenous groups from Thatta and Badin filed petitions in the Sindh High Court, demanding a moratorium on all SIFC-led agricultural expansions that involve resource diversion without consent. The canal project’s freeze was welcomed but interpreted as tactical rather than principled-a delay rather than a cancellation.
Beyond agriculture, Gulf influence has penetrated energy and port infrastructure. In the power sector, Saudi Arabia’s Al?Jomaih Power, holding a 66.4 per cent stake in K?Electric, entered a bitter dispute in 2025 with AsiaPak’s Shaheryar Chishty over board appointments and operational control. Legal wrangling in the Cayman Islands and Pakistan, with a court stay halting reforms tied to a $2 billion restructuring plan, has prompted SIFC and military figures to intervene to maintain Saudi confidence. Meanwhile, the dispute has left Karachi’s power consumers in uncertainty. Plans for smart grid expansion, underground cabling, and renewable integration have stalled due to corporate paralysis.
Meanwhile, AD Ports Group of Abu Dhabi signed a 50-year concession on Karachi’s Gateway Terminal (berths 6-9) in June 2023, committing $220 million over 10 years to handle up to 1 million TEUs annually through deepening dock access to 15 meters. In early 2025, they advanced another 25-year agreement for bulk and general cargo terminals, planning $75 million in improvements. They also inked an MoU in February 2025 to develop an industrial zone with Pakistan’s Board of Investment, tied to free-zone and digital logistics ambitions. The terms, while beneficial in customs efficiency and cargo handling standards, have raised concerns about loss of port sovereignty, pricing autonomy, and security oversight. These Gulf deals address Pakistan’s urgent need for capital-from IMF conditions to foreign debt rollovers-but come with deep strategic implications. Agriculture investors secure 30-year leases and priority irrigation; ports and power sectors remain under SIFC’s direct purview, often bypassing parliamentary or provincial oversight. The situation is further complicated by Pakistan’s constitutional ambiguities over land rights and centre-province control. Legal experts warn that many of the Gulf-linked lease deals may violate Article 172 and land-related clauses in the 18th Amendment, which devolves land management to provinces. Yet, most provincial governments are either complicit or marginalised in SIFC negotiations.
The societal fallout is emerging vividly. Sindhi and Punjabi farmers, along with fisherfolk, mobilised against water diversions in early 2025. Movements like Sindhi Hari Tehreek, PKRC, and AMP have raised legal challenges against state-run corporate farms. A BBC Urdu report described it bluntly: “In the current corporate farming model, farmers will be displaced… with absolutely no transparency and no one knows who is getting land and at what cost.” Climate activists argue that over 80 per cent of the land designated as ‘barren’ by LIMS is actually in ecological use-pastures, floodplains, or rotational crop zones. Displacing such usage not only endangers biodiversity but also undercuts carbon sequestration, affecting Pakistan’s climate targets under the Paris Agreement.
K?Electric’s dispute is hampering Karachi’s power sector revival, with Gulf investors threatening to withhold further capital amid uncertainty. AD Ports’ terminal investments are dollarized and insulated from rupee volatility, shifting Karachi’s logistics axis toward Gulf-run infrastructure. The same playbook is being mirrored in Balochistan, where Qatar and Saudi Arabia have expressed interest in building LNG terminals and mineral corridors-potentially bypassing local communities and exacerbating tensions in an already restive region.
While Gulf statecraft is advancing through investment, Pakistan risks deeper dependency and shrinking oversight. SIFC’s power to allocate lands and infrastructure deeply limits provincial and parliamentary input. Risk lies in public transparency and environmental governance being sidelined for Gulf pipelines of capital. The growing influence of Gulf capitals is also starting to appear in softer domains: media, tech incubators, Islamic banking, and even sports diplomacy. In March 2025, the Pakistan Super League announced a three-year naming rights deal with a Dubai-based conglomerate backed by the UAE’s sovereign fund. In June, a new digital payments company, co-funded by a Qatari fintech incubator, received a fast-track license from the central bank, raising eyebrows among local startups still waiting for approvals. These developments suggest that economic leverage is morphing into narrative influence.
For Pakistan to benefit equitably, structural safeguards are essential: full publication of MOUs and concession agreements, rights guarantees for small farmers and fisherfolk, parliamentary vetting of state asset transfers, and diversified FDI from non-Gulf partners. Free trade zones and processing facilities should be domestically managed to capture downstream value. Equally important is a public debate on long-term national goals. Is the current investment model designed to make Pakistan an export hub or a leased economy servicing external needs? Are we securing technology transfers, local employment, and value-addition, or are we simply outsourcing responsibility in exchange for liquidity?
Gulf investments provide Pakistan with much-needed financial ballast, but unchecked, they risk trading sovereignty and public trust for short-term stability. With the Green Pakistan Initiative and SIFC at the helm, Pakistan’s challenge now is to turn these petrodollar-led investments into equitable, transparent growth, rather than an under-the-radar economic pivot toward Gulf dominance. At a time when global south alliances are being redefined, Pakistan must ensure that its future isn’t quietly mortgaged in exchange for survival. Because once strategic control is outsourced, reclaiming it becomes a generational challenge-if not an impossibility.
The writer is a financial expert and can be reached at jawadsaleem.1982@ gmail.com. He tweets @JawadSaleem1982