The situation in Balochistan is complex and cannot be understood without examining its underlying details. What the state faces is not a single, identifiable threat but a multi layered phenomenon resembling a hydra headed force. The campaign of violence against the state manifests in different forms and operates through multiple channels. There are those who carry out acts of terrorism directly. Alongside them are actors who provide these elements with a human rights cover. Others facilitate them by constructing narratives of victimhood that obscure the reality of their actions. In addition, there are individuals who contribute to their recruitment, drawing support from educational institutions and segments of society. All these elements function in coordination. They reinforce one another and generate confusion, making it difficult for the public to clearly understand the true nature of the threat.
BYC’s protest activities, particularly in Islamabad and Quetta, have also drawn criticism for what authorities describe as overt or implicit sympathies with militant elements.
If society becomes united, it becomes far more difficult for such elements to operate. For this reason, efforts are made to prevent unity and instead maintain a state of confusion and division. Through arguments built on uncertainty and selective reasoning, acts of terrorism are rationalized. A narrative framed in the language of human rights is developed against the state, further complicating public perception. Individuals who are present in militant camps are at times portrayed as missing persons, and this portrayal is used to mobilize opinion against the state. In such an environment, it becomes challenging for the average citizen to separate fact from distortion.
Within this broader framework, state institutions perceive the Baloch Yakjehti Council as a humanized extension of the same network, one that operates through narrative construction and public mobilization rather than overt violence.
The state’s decision to place activists linked to BYC on the Fourth Schedule should be understood not as an act of political victimization but as a constitutionally grounded counterterrorism measure. In the context of Pakistan’s internal security framework, such actions fall within the legal mandate of the state to monitor and restrict individuals suspected of involvement in activities that threaten public safety and national stability.
Evidence presented by security and intelligence sources suggests that BYC functions as more than a civil rights platform. It is alleged to operate as a front that provides ideological and logistical cover to militant organizations such as the BLA and BLF, framing its activities under the language of human rights advocacy while facilitating anti state agendas. Individuals associated with the group, including Dr Sabhia, Dr Shalee, Gulzadi, Mahrang Baloch, and Sammi Deen, have been accused of maintaining direct or indirect links with networks described as Fitna ul Hindustan and other proscribed outfits.
The leadership of BYC has also come under scrutiny for alleged historical and familial ties to militant movements. Figures such as Mahrang Baloch and Sammi Deen are portrayed by critics as inheritors of legacies linked to insurgent commanders whose activities contributed to significant civilian casualties in Balochistan. These associations, whether symbolic or operational, continue to shape perceptions of the group’s intent and direction.
Operational linkages have further been highlighted through specific cases. For instance, Sohaib Langove, a BLA operative killed during a security forces operation in Kalat in July 2025, was reportedly associated with BYC circles and is alleged to have acted as both a recruiter and facilitator, using protest camps as a means to identify and mobilize potential recruits. Similarly, reconciled former militant commander Sarfaraz Bangalzai has publicly claimed that BYC gatherings were used for recruitment and fundraising activities connected to insurgent operations.
BYC’s protest activities, particularly in Islamabad and Quetta, have also drawn criticism for what authorities describe as overt or implicit sympathies with militant elements. This includes allegations of providing space and narrative support to families of militants killed abroad and portraying known operatives as missing persons. Campaigns highlighting individuals such as Wadood Satakzai, Karim Jan, Rafiq Bizenjo, Sohail Kurd, and Sohaib Langove as victims of enforced disappearance have been cited as examples of this narrative strategy.
Concerns have also been raised about the role of women within these networks, with cases like Gajatoon and Mahal Baloch illustrating how individuals reportedly disappeared from their homes and later surfaced as trained suicide bombers linked to militant camps. Such incidents are used by security analysts to argue that the line between activism and militancy, in this context, is increasingly blurred.
Taken together, these allegations form the basis of the state’s position that BYC represents not merely a dissenting political voice but a proxy network advancing hostile agendas against Pakistan through a combination of narrative construction, mobilization, and alleged facilitation of militant activity.
The writer is a freelance columnist.