Pakistan has rarely entered a major international crisis with as much composure, purpose and consequence as it has in the US-Iran endgame. At Burgenstock, Islamabad was not waiting outside the room for others to decide the region’s fate. It was in the room, alongside Qatar, turning a war that could have engulfed the Gulf into a negotiating process. In an international system that too often remembers Pakistan only through crisis, this was a diplomatic correction of considerable weight.
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s presence at the summit, accompanied by Chief of Defence Forces Field Marshal Asim Munir, gave Pakistan’s role both political and security weight. Munir’s sustained back-channel engagement and Qatar’s parallel mediation produced what few thought possible: a political opening between Washington and Tehran after more than a hundred days of escalation. US Vice President JD Vance’s remark that peace requires give-and-take eloquently captured the burden of the process. This unrelenting shuttle diplomacy was not a favour to Washington, Tehran or Doha. It was an assertion of Pakistan’s own strategic weight. Islamabad stepped in because no country in the region had more to lose from a wider war and because few had the channels, credibility and urgency needed to keep a political track alive.
From the very outset, our leadership had clearly recognised how the world economy would have to pay the price of oil shocks, shipping disruption and regional uncertainty. To state the obvious, Pakistan did not mediate to polish its image or remain in the limelight. Contrarily, it mediated because stability in the Muslim world is central to its own security.
At the end of the day, Pakistan has shown that a state often underestimated by hostile capitals can still act with strategic seriousness when the stakes are high. It has undercut attempts to isolate it diplomatically and reminded the world that its diplomatic corps, security establishment and political leadership can work in concert when national purpose is clear.
The harder test begins now. The MoU may have stopped the slide into a wider war, but it has not settled the conflict. One Washington assessment has argued that Iran lost militarily but won heavily at the table. Tehran appears to have secured an end to military operations, movement on assets and oil, relief around Hormuz, and political space to negotiate the nuclear file later. The US, by contrast, has bought time, lower oil anxiety and a chance to repair ties with anxious Gulf partners. These are not small gains, but they do not answer the tougher questions on enriched uranium, inspections, missiles, proxies and enforcement. A pause will not turn into peace unless it is enforced across all fronts. Lebanon remains the most dangerous fault line. If Israeli strikes continue, if Israeli forces remain on Lebanese territory, or if hardliners exploit ambiguity, the MoU could unravel before it matures. Islamabad helped open a door many thought had closed. It must now help keep it open. *