Twenty-two men flown to Pakistan from a seized Iranian ship should not–and cannot–be treated as a diplomatic footnote. The Foreign Office has rightly called the evacuation of the MV Touska crew a confidence-building measure by the United States. Fair enough. Pakistan should welcome any step that returns detained men to their families and lowers the temperature around Iran. Yet the harder question is still waiting at the door: what does Islamabad (or any responsible capital, for that matter) do when the Strait of Hormuz becomes both a battlefield and a bargaining table?
The crisis around Iran seems to have entered a dangerous maritime phase, with the narrow corridor carrying a critical share of global energy supplies becoming a theatre of pressure. The US is attempting to restore movement through what it calls “Project Freedom,” while maintaining pressure on Iranian ports. Iran, for its part, has warned that vessels transiting the strait must coordinate with its armed forces, and has treated American involvement as a breach of understandings reached after the latest ceasefire.
Pakistan cannot afford slogans here. It shares a border with Iran, depends on Gulf stability, receives lifelines from workers across the GCC, and imports economic pain whenever energy routes panic.
That is why Pakistan’s role must be pro-Pakistan before it is pro-anyone else. That means refusing to be pulled into the vocabulary of either camp. Washington will describe its actions as enforcement and freedom of navigation. Meanwhile, Tehran will frame its posture as resistance and sovereignty. Pakistan should listen to both, but borrow neither script wholesale. Its own interests lie in de-escalation, civilian protection, uninterrupted commercial traffic, and the prevention of a wider regional war.
Pakistan has spent recent weeks trying to keep channels open and position itself as a useful intermediary rather than a partisan actor. That effort should be deepened. The Touska handover suggests that both sides still see value in Pakistan as a practical bridge; not just as a grand mediator with magical leverage, but a state trusted enough to handle sensitive humanitarian and diplomatic steps. That role is worth protecting. Islamabad should use it to push for limited, practical understandings: safe passage for commercial vessels; humanitarian channels and reliable naval communication to prevent any miscalculation. These may sound like small demands beside the thunder of war. They are not. In a militarised waterway, even the smallest of arrangements can prevent large disasters. *