Pakistan cannot free itself from the IMF through one emotional speech, one patriotic slogan, or one strict budget. Real freedom comes only when the country stops moving from one balance-of-payments crisis to another. That can happen only when Pakistan earns enough foreign exchange, collects taxes fairly, spends public money carefully, and grows strongly enough to create jobs for its people. Pakistan’s long relationship with the IMF shows that the real problem is not one bad year or one weak government. The deeper problem is that the economy still does not produce enough strength from within. It still struggles to raise enough revenue at home, expand exports with consistency, and reduce waste in sectors that continuously drain national resources. That is why freedom from the IMF will not come through one budget cycle. It will come only through a long-term economic plan built on production, discipline, and institutional reform.
The reality is that Pakistan is more stable today than it was during the worst phase of the crisis. Inflation has come down to 7.3 per cent, the policy rate stands at 10.5 per cent, and foreign exchange reserves have risen to about $16.38 billion. These are meaningful improvements. They show that the economy has moved away from immediate danger. But stability is not the same thing as strength. A patient who has left the emergency room is not necessarily healthy enough to run. In the same way, Pakistan has reduced short-term pressure, but it still has not built a self-sustaining growth model that can end repeated dependence on outside support.
Pakistan needs a serious national bargain built on a few hard choices: earn more through exports, tax fairly, reform wasteful state structures, fix the energy sector, and invest in people.
That weakness becomes clear when growth is examined honestly. Pakistan’s GDP growth for FY2024-25 was revised to 3.06 per cent. That is better than stagnation, but it is still not enough for a country with a young, expanding population and a constant need for jobs, investment, and rising incomes. Three per cent growth may prevent collapse, but it does not create transformation. It keeps the country moving, but too slowly to escape the same old cycle. A country like Pakistan needs stronger and broader growth, not merely recovery from crisis. It needs an economy that expands through industry, exports, investment, and productivity rather than through temporary relief and short bursts of stabilisation.
The external sector tells the same story. Remittances have remained a major support, reaching $26.5 billion during July to February of FY2026, while foreign direct investment during the same period was only about $1.2 billion. This contrast says a great deal. Pakistan is still being held up more by the hard work of overseas Pakistanis than by the confidence of long-term investors or the power of its own productive base. A country cannot build lasting economic sovereignty when family support from abroad is stronger than industrial competitiveness at home. Remittances are valuable, but they are not a substitute for exports, investment, and value-added production. The goal should not be to survive on inflows sent by citizens working elsewhere. The goal should be to build an economy strong enough that capital wants to come into Pakistan because it sees opportunity, efficiency, and stability.
That is why the first real plan for getting rid of the IMF must be an export plan, not a borrowing plan. Pakistan must stop thinking of exports as a narrow activity tied mainly to a few traditional sectors. It must build a broader earning economy. That means supporting engineering goods, information technology, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, processed food, minerals with value addition, and business services. It means reducing the cost of doing business, ensuring faster refunds, improving logistics, stabilising tariff policy, and providing cheaper and more reliable energy to productive sectors. The country does not lack entrepreneurial talent. It lacks a policy environment that consistently rewards production over speculation. If exports do not rise in a sustained way, Pakistan will continue to face dollar shortages, and whenever dollars become scarce, IMF dependence returns.
The second part of the answer is fiscal honesty. Pakistan cannot call itself economically sovereign while the state remains burdened by debt and weak revenue collection. There is, however, one encouraging sign: the tax-to-GDP ratio rose to 10.3 per cent in FY2024-25, reaching double digits for the first time in more than a decade. This matters because it shows that progress is possible when the state uses enforcement, documentation, and digital systems seriously. But this improvement should not create false comfort. The tax system is still too narrow and too unequal. Salaried people and documented businesses should not continue to carry the main load while large sections of retail, wholesale trade, speculative real estate, and high-income agriculture remain lightly taxed or poorly documented. Pakistan does not need random taxation or endless mini-budgets. It needs a wider, fairer, and smarter tax system. That requires digital invoicing, realistic property valuation, better land records, and above all, the political courage to tax powerful interests that have long remained outside the effective net.
A third necessary reform is the restructuring of the state’s own economic role. Pakistan does not need a weak government. It needs a government that governs well instead of doing business badly. Loss-making state-owned enterprises remain a major burden, with aggregate losses reported at about $2.98 billion in FY2024-25. That is money that could have gone into schools, ports, irrigation, healthcare, technology, or industrial infrastructure. When public entities continuously absorb resources without producing efficiency, the whole economy pays the price. Investors lose confidence, public finances weaken, and reform becomes harder. That is why privatisation, where needed, restructuring, where possible, professional management, and strict accountability are not ideological choices. They are economic necessities. A country cannot ask for financial freedom while continuing to finance inefficiency on such a large scale.
The fourth pillar is energy reform. Pakistan cannot become a competitive export economy while power remains expensive, unreliable, and distorted by poor governance. Productive industry needs affordable energy, not politically designed pricing and chronic inefficiency. If factories are forced to operate under high costs and uncertainty, then exports suffer, investment slows, and growth weakens. Energy reform therefore, has to move from slogans to execution. Transmission losses must be reduced, theft must be controlled, subsidies must become targeted rather than wasteful, and distribution companies must be professionally managed. Without energy reform, even the best industrial policy will remain incomplete.
The fifth pillar, and perhaps the most important in the long run, is investment in people. A country cannot build a modern economy while leaving millions behind in weak schools, poor health systems, and low-skill employment. Pakistan often treats education, skills, nutrition, and primary healthcare as social spending that can be postponed. In reality, they are economic investments. A skilled and healthy population is not a luxury. It is the foundation of productivity, innovation, and competitiveness. If Pakistan wants to reduce dependence on the IMF, it must start producing workers, managers, technicians, engineers, and entrepreneurs who can raise national output and expand the economy from within.
So, what economic plan can help Pakistan get rid of the IMF? The answer is not mysterious. Pakistan needs a serious national bargain built on a few hard choices: earn more through exports, tax fairly, reform wasteful state structures, fix the energy sector, and invest in people. It should continue stabilising inflation and the external account, but it must stop mistaking stabilisation for success. Stability is only the beginning. The real destination is an economy that earns enough, saves enough, and grows enough to stand without repeated rescue. Pakistan will get rid of the IMF only when it replaces the politics of short-term survival with the economics of long-term earning.
The writer is a PhD (Media and Crime), Founder of CASRO (Crime Analytics and Security Research Organisation), and can be reached at dr.nasirkhan.jasak @gmail.com