The relationship between the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) and the banned Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has drawn increasing scrutiny from security analysts and state authorities who describe it as a two-stage pipeline for radicalisation and recruitment. According to this assessment, BYC functions as a social and ideological network that prepares vulnerable youth, while BLA absorbs these individuals into terrorist structures for training and operations. The first stage is the BYC-led radicalisation phase.
Through public demonstrations, campus activism, and social media campaigns, BYC frames issues such as alleged disappearances and claims of state oppression. The narrative is amplified across digital platforms, targeting students and educated urban youth, with particular emphasis on Baloch women from middle-class backgrounds. Security reports argue that many of these women do not have personal experiences of family disappearances or direct economic hardship, suggesting that ideological grooming and propaganda play a central role in mobilisation.
The second stage is the BLA transition phase. Individuals who have been exposed to BYC’s grievance-based messaging are then approached by BLA operatives. They are gradually moved from protest circles into underground networks where they receive weapons handling, explosives training, and tactical instruction in remote areas. Over time, some recruits are assigned to logistics, propaganda, combat units, and the BLA’s Majeed Brigade, including roles as suicide bombers. A notable shift has been the growing involvement of educated Baloch women in militant activities. Before 2020, female participation in armed groups in Balochistan was rare and largely undocumented.
The historical record shows little evidence of women in Balochistan directly participating in terrorism before BYC’s establishment in 2020.
That pattern began to change after the formation of BYC. On April 26, 2022, Shari Baloch carried out a suicide bombing at Karachi University. It was the first confirmed female suicide attack linked to Baloch militancy. Videos that surfaced afterwards appeared to show women undergoing organised training in BLA camps. The timeline suggests a correlation between BYC’s public mobilisation and the emergence of female suicide attackers. Summiya Qalandarani struck in Turbat on June 3, 2023. Mahal Baloch was involved in an attack in Bela in August 2024. Gwadar’s Ganjatoon attack followed in March 2025.
In February 2026, Zarina Rafiq Baloch carried out a bombing in Nokundi, while Asifa Mengal and Hawa Baloch were linked to suicide operations during the same month under the CTA II designation. Many of these women were university-educated and did not come from families with missing persons or clear socio-economic deprivation. Analysts argue that this points to ideological indoctrination rather than personal grievance as the primary driver.
BLA and associated networks have portrayed these attackers as “heroes of resistance” and “empowered fighters,” a framing that blurs the boundary between peaceful activism and armed violence.BYC presents itself as a human rights and advocacy organisation. Critics argue that it serves as a “humanitarian facade” that exploits genuine Baloch grievances to radicalise young people, especially women. Specific allegations include BYC-linked protests intercepting ambulances to transport bodies of terrorists, and clashes during demonstrations that resulted in injuries to police personnel.
Testimonies have added to these concerns. In a press release, a Baloch girl identified as Laiba stated that TTP commanders manipulated her with facilitation from a BYC member. She named Dr Sabiha and certain BYC elements as being involved in influencing and preparing women for suicide operations. Such accounts have raised questions about the networks operating behind activist platforms. BYC’s refusal to condemn BLA attacks, kidnappings, and civilian casualties is cited as evidence of ideological alignment.
One widely cited case is that of Wadood Satakzai, whose sister Gulzadi portrayed him as a missing person. The narrative collapsed when he appeared in the Mach attack as a suicide bomber celebrated by the BLA. Similarly, individuals previously described by BYC as victims of “enforced disappearances” were later glorified by the BLA and BLF as terrorists, including Kareem Jan, Sufyan Kurd, and Sohaib Langove. The historical record shows little evidence of women in Balochistan directly participating in terrorism before BYC’s establishment in 2020.
Within two years, the pattern changed sharply, with female suicide bombers emerging and their training being openly promoted. This shift has led state authorities to describe BYC as a systematic recruitment and radicalisation pipeline that exploits Baloch grievances to push young women into violence. Proponents of a ban argue that formal prohibition is necessary to protect Baloch women from ideological exploitation, grooming, and deployment as suicide bombers. They contend that allowing the pipeline to operate unchecked endangers both public safety and the future of Baloch youth.
The writer is a freelance columnist.