It is astonishing that, with an installed capacity of 46,605 MW, industry is facing 2 to 4 hours of load-shedding, while domestic and commercial consumers are enduring 7 to 16 hours of darkness every single day. Can anyone explain the science behind this power management? This is not a rhetorical outburst-it is a fundamental question that strikes at the heart of Pakistan’s power sector dysfunction. When the numbers are laid bare, the crisis appears less like a shortage of electricity and more like a collapse of governance.
Gohar Ejaz has emerged as a prominent voice in Pakistan’s energy discourse, consistently reiterating that Pakistan’s power crisis is rooted less in capacity shortages and more in governance failures. Even though the installed capacity exceeds 46,605 MW, problems with transmission, fuel management, and distribution still make electricity expensive and unreliable for consumers. He has emphasized structural reforms such as forensic audits of IPPs, a shift from “take-or-pay” to “take-and-pay” contracts, and the gradual elimination of capacity payments that inflate electricity prices. He also supports the privatization of DISCOs and the creation of a competitive electricity market to improve transparency and efficiency.
As of April 15, 2026, the figures stand as follows: installed capacity is 46,605 MW; peak demand is 20,520 MW; generation during peak demand is 13,958 MW; and the shortfall is 4,090 MW. These numbers do not make sense. A nation with more than twice the necessary installed capacity should not experience power outages of this scale-yet Pakistan does. What makes this even more alarming is that summer has not fully arrived, yet peak demand already stands at 20,520 MW. From June to August, it routinely rises to 30,000-33,000 MW. If the system is already faltering under moderate demand, what will happen when the real stress test begins?
The answer is simple: the crisis will deepen, and the burden will once again fall on consumers and industry alike. This is not a capacity problem; it is a failure of governance and management in the power sector. For years, policymakers have argued that Pakistan’s electricity problems stem from a lack of supply, leading to costly capacity additions, IPP contracts, and long-term financial commitments. However, the current situation reveals that the country is paying for capacity it cannot effectively utilize.
Hydropower generation has declined significantly because the Neelum-Jhelum project-once expected to provide low-cost electricity-remains non-operational. This is not merely a technical fault; it is a failure of maintenance planning and institutional accountability. When low-cost generation assets fall out of the system, the entire cost structure shifts upward, forcing reliance on more expensive alternatives. At the same time, gas-based power plants-designed to provide flexible and relatively affordable energy-remain underutilized. The issue is not a lack of infrastructure but poor fuel management. Gas is often misallocated instead of being strategically directed toward power generation during peak demand, leading to wasted capacity when it is needed most.
There is also the paradox of renewable energy. Solar capacity disappears at night, precisely when demand peaks, and there is no storage or load-shifting mechanism in place. This is not a critique of solar power itself, but of inadequate system planning. Integrating renewable energy into a national grid requires foresight-battery storage, demand-side management, and intelligent dispatch systems. Without these, solar becomes a daytime luxury rather than a reliable component of the energy mix.
Equally critical is the weakness of Pakistan’s transmission infrastructure. Even when electricity is available, the grid often lacks the capacity to deliver it where it is needed. Bottlenecks, outdated lines, and poor coordination between generation and distribution entities create artificial shortages. In essence, power exists-but it cannot travel. Meanwhile, the people of Pakistan are paying for 46,605 MW of installed capacity in their electricity bills, yet the availability of that capacity when it is most needed remains uncertain.
This raises an uncomfortable but necessary question: what exactly are consumers paying for? Capacity payments-fixed charges paid to power producers regardless of actual generation-have become a defining feature of Pakistan’s energy economics. Their original purpose was to build investor confidence and ensure supply stability. However, in the absence of efficient utilization, they have become a financial burden on both the state and the public. The result is a system that effectively pays for inefficiency. Power plants are compensated whether or not they generate electricity. Distribution companies incur losses due to theft and inefficiency. Circular debt continues to rise. And the end consumer pays higher tariffs for unreliable service.
The gap between what exists and what is delivered is not an engineering problem-it is a governance and management failure. Fuel planning is inconsistent. Dispatch decisions are often influenced by financial and contractual constraints rather than system efficiency. Grid coordination remains fragmented. Financial discipline is weak, allowing circular debt to spiral. These are not insurmountable challenges; they are failures of policy execution.
Pakistan does not need more megawatts-it needs better management. For a power system to function effectively, generation, transmission, distribution, and regulation must operate in harmony. Each layer must communicate, coordinate, and prioritize national efficiency over institutional silos. In Pakistan, these layers often operate in isolation, with overlapping mandates and limited accountability.
The consequences extend beyond load-shedding. Industries cannot operate at full capacity, reducing exports and employment. Small businesses struggle to survive under erratic power supply. Households face financial strain and a declining quality of life. Yet the narrative continues to focus on adding more capacity, as if mismanagement can be solved with more infrastructure. This approach is not only flawed-it is dangerous. Expanding capacity without addressing governance will worsen financial burdens, deepen debt, and perpetuate inefficiency.
The real solution lies in optimization, not expansion. Pakistan must focus on restoring and maintaining existing hydropower assets such as Neelum-Jhelum. It must rationalize fuel allocation so that gas plants operate when they are most needed. It must invest in grid modernization to eliminate transmission bottlenecks. It must integrate renewable energy with storage solutions and demand management strategies.
Most importantly, it must enforce accountability. Regulatory bodies must move beyond passive oversight and actively ensure performance standards. Distribution companies must be held responsible for losses. Policy decisions must be guided by data rather than short-term political considerations. None of these reforms require revolutionary technology. They require political will, institutional discipline, and a commitment to governance. The capacity already exists. The real question is: who is managing it-and how? Until that question is answered with honesty and action, Pakistan’s power crisis will persist-not as a failure of engineering, but as a failure of leadership.
The writer is a freelance columnist